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Abstract 
 
We provide an explanation for why estate taxation is surprisingly little used over the world, given 
the skewness of the estate distribution. Taxing estates implies meddling with intra-family 
decisions, which may be frown upon by many. At the same time, the concentration of estates 
means that a low proportion of the population stands to gain a lot by decreasing estate taxation. 
We provide an analytical model, together with numerical simulations, where agents bequeathing 
large estates make monetary contributions that are used to play up the salience of the 
encroachment aspects of estate taxation on family decisions in order to decrease its political 
support. 
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1 Introduction
Whereas wealth inequality has, on the whole, trended downwards in the
20th century, we have recently witnessed sharp reversals in a number of
countries, the most striking example being the United States.1 Moreover, the
distribution of inherited wealth is much more unequal than that of wealth in
general. Given the extreme skewness of the distribution of inherited wealth,
one would assume that a majority of households are in favor of nancing part
of public expenditure/redistribution with a tax on inheritance. Yet, such a
tax is not popular and one rather observes a continuous erosion of wealth
transfer taxation in many OECD countries, and especially in the U.S.2 How
to explain this apparent paradox is the question at the heart of this paper.
Focusing on the U.S., our line of explanation relies on the observations
that a small number of very wealthy individuals make large contributions to
think tanks and lobby groups whose objective is to repeal the federal estate
tax, and that these groups often underscore the fact that estate taxation
meddles with intra-family decisions. As Tabarrok (2012) writes: «So long
as men are mortal, wealth must be transferred between the generations and
so long as parents care for their children, the dominant means of doing so
will be through family inheritance. The transference of wealth through family
benets bequeather and heir, strengthens family ties, and increases long-term
savings. When the state intervenes in this process, it increases its co¤ers
at the expense of the smooth operation of family, society, and economy» .
Cunli¤e et al (2012) further state that inheritance taxes are viewed with
suspicion because they threaten family solidarity and unity, at the especially
sensitive time of the death of one of its members.
Gratz and Shapiro (2005) and Lincoln et al (2006) describe the cam-
paign of the super wealthy to kill the estate tax. These super wealthy have
reported nearly half a billion dollars in lobbying expenditures from 1998 to
2006, and stand to save upward of 70 billion dollars in case of a repeal of
the estate tax. They also nance think tanks and outside groups that pro-
duce ad campaigns intended to sway public opinion against the estate tax
(Lincoln et al, 2006, p8). An example of such an outside group is The Amer-
ican Family Business Institute, a trade association of family business owners,
farmers, and entrepreneurs. This and other organizations invest large amount
1See Davies and Shorrocks (2000) and more recently Piketty and Zucman (2013).
2Cremer and Pestieau (2012).
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of money at educating Congress, the media and the public about the costs
of the estate tax in order to build pressure for permanent repeal.
The gist of our paper is that wealth concentration makes it possible and
attractive for a small fraction of the population, the super wealthy, to play
up the encroachment on family decisions of estate taxation in order to draw
down its political support. We model this as a contribution game, where very
rich people endow organizations whose objective is to increase the salience
for voters of family concerns, and thus to dampen their support for estate
taxation. To do so, we use the concept of Kantian equilibrium, and the
modeling proposed by Roemer (2006, 2010). We obtain numerically that
the majority chosen estate tax rate is signicantly decreased at the Kantian
equilibrium contribution game, and we provide some comparative statics
analysis. A striking result we obtain is that average donation per contributor
increases when fewer people contribute.
2 The model with exogenous salience of fam-
ily values
We consider an economy with a continuum of individuals i who di¤er in their
endowment wi which is distributed according to the positively skewed c.d.f.
F (wi); so that the average endowment, w, is larger than the median one,
wmed. Each individual has a child she cares for and allocates her endowment
between consumption ci and bequest bi. The government taxes bequests
at a proportional rate  and uses the tax proceeds to produce an amount
a of public good, with the function a() given by the government budget
constraint
a = 
Z
bidF (wi): (1)
The utility of a parent is given by
Ui = u(ci) + v(di) + a()  '(); (2)
where u(ci) is the utility obtained from ones own consumption and v(di)
is the utility derived from the endowment of the unique child, with both
functions increasing and concave.3 The last term in (2) reects the salience
3This specication is often used in overlapping generations models where individuals
are concerned with their own consumption and the initial endowment their children will
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of the concerns that estate taxation encroaches on family decisions (family
concerns from now on). This term is the product of the salience of this
dimension, measured by   0, and of the concerns themselves, measured
by the function ' which is increasing and convex in . This formulation
embodies two assumptions: (i) the family concerns ' depend on the value
of the estate tax rate, but not on the amount of tax paid by the individual,
and (ii) the multiplicative form assumed between salience  and concerns
' means that all agents have identical disutility from the fact that estate
taxation encroaches on intra-family decisions.
We study the following three stage setting. In the rst stage, the para-
meter  is endogenously determined through the intensity of an advertising
campaign of the wealthy, as described below in section 3. In the second stage,
all parents vote over the value of the estate taxation rate . In the third stage,
each parent chooses the amount of bequest bi she wants to leave to her o¤-
spring, and then enjoys the amount of public good a obtained thanks to the
government budget constraint (1). Children do not make any decision.
We solve the game by backward induction, starting with the choice of
bequest bi for given values of the estate taxation rate  and of the salience
of family values .
2.1 Individual bequest choice
An individual with endowment wi expects his child to have an endowment re-
ecting a process of regression towards the mean, plus the net-of-tax bequest
that she leaves to her child, so that
di = wi + (1  ) w + bi(1  );
while ci = wi   bi.
The individual bequest is obtained by maximizing (2) with respect to bi,
which yields
@Ui
@bi
=  u0(ci) + v0(di)(1  )  0;
so that the individually optimal bequest level is a¤ected by the estate tax
rate  (assumed exogenous at this stage) but does not depend on the salience
of family concerns, .
benet from. A classic reference for this is Glomm and Ravikumar (1992). The component
v(di) can be justied by some form of imperfect altruism.
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Assuming logarithmic utilities u(:) and v(:) from now on,4 the rst-order
condition (FOC) for bi becomes
(1  )ci  di:
Agents with a low endowment would prefer to leave a negative bequest , which
is not allowed. To obtain the threshold parental endowment w^() below which
the individual optimal bequest is nil, we solve the following equation:
@U
@bi
cbi=0 = 0;
so that
w^() =
(1  ) w
1     : (3)
Note that w^() increases with , with w^(0) = w and thus w^() > w when
 > 0. Since w > wmed; a minority of agents leave a bequest whether the tax
on bequest is positive or nil. This is in accordance with stylized facts. Note
that w^() tends toward 1 as  tends towards 1  : nobody leaves bequest
for   1  .
When wi > w^(), the FOC for an interior solution for bequests is
(wi   bi)(1  ) = wi + (1  ) w + bi(1  )
or
bi =
w(1     )  w(1  )
2(1  ) (4)
=
w
2
  w + (1  ) w
2(1  ) ;
where a star denotes the individually optimal level of the variable. We then
obtain that bequests increase with income and decrease with taxation: as
taxation increases, the set of (rich) agents who leave a bequest shrinks and
they all leave smaller bequests.
We now move backward to the second stage decision, namely majority
voting over the tax rate 
4This assumption is made for tractability and is quite innocuous, unlike the stronger
assumption of additivity of u(:) and v(:) in Ui.
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2.2 Voting over the estate tax rate
Since we have already established that a majority of voters (including the
median income parent) never leave a bequest, whatever the values of  and ,
we immediately obtain that the Condorcet winning value of  (i.e., the value
that is preferred by a majority of voters over any other feasible value) is the
one most-preferred by the individual with the median endowment, wmed.5
The FOC for her most-preferred estate tax rate, denoted by V , is then given
by
a0()  '0(V )  0: (5)
The decisive voter compares the marginal benet of the estate tax (the in-
crease in the amount of the public good a) with its marginal cost (in terms
of the salience of family concerns). If family concerns of the estate tax have
no salience ( = 0), the decisive voter chooses the value of  that maximizes
the tax proceeds. This value is interior since, as we have seen, no one leaves
a bequest if   1   . Assuming from now on that a is a concave func-
tion of , we obtain that this value is unique and we denote it by Laf : It is
straightforward that V decreases as  increases. If the salience parameter 
is large enough, the decisive voter may prefer no estate taxation at all, even
though she does not contribute while she enjoys the public good.6
We now move to the rst stage of the game where the salience of family
concerns is determined.
3 The setting of the salience of family con-
cerns
We now assume that the salience parameter  can be a¤ected by the in-
tensity with which voters are faced with messages (such as media reports,
interviews, talk shows, etc.) stressing that estate taxation encroaches on
intra-family decisions. These messages are produced by think tanks and
similar organizations, which are funded by high income individuals. More
5Alternatively, we can show that preferences are single-crossing in  (see Gans and
Smart (1996)) so that the median income agent would remain decisive even if a majority
of parents were to leave a bequest. The proof of this statement is available upon request
from the authors.
6For simplicity, we assume in the rest of the paper that V > 0 (so that (5) holds with
equality), in accordance with the numerical results obtained in the last section.
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precisely, we assume that agents with an endowment above some exogenous
value, denoted by ~w, contribute voluntarily to nance these organizations.
We denote by ei the contribution of an agent with endowment wi, so that
the per capita amount of contribution, e, is given by
e =
1Z
~w
eidF (wi): (6)
We do not model explicitly the process by which these contributions a¤ect
the salience of this issue, but rather assume that the salience parameter is
an increasing and concave function of the per capita contribution, (e):
All agents with wi  ~w decide simultaneously how much to contribute,
anticipating the impact of the resulting per capita contribution on the ma-
jority chosen estate tax rate. Our point in this paper is not to emphasize
the free riding problem among rich agents in this contribution game. We
rather concentrate on the Kantian equilibrium of this contribution game, as
modeled by Roemer (2006, 2010). A Kantian equilibrium is such that no
contributor would like to see all contributors (including himself) vary their
(positive)7 contribution by the same (positive or negative) percentage.8 We
write the utility function of a contributor i with endowment wi as a function
of her contribution ei, the vector of all other individualscontributions, e i,
and of the common multiplicative factor r as
Ui(rei; re i) = Log(wi   bi   rei) + a(V ) (7)
+Log(wi + (1  ) w + (1  V )bi )  (e)'(V );
where V is the majority chosen value of  in the next stage, given by (5)
with  = (re) and where e is given by (6). A vector of contributions ei for
all individuals i with wi  ~w is a Kantian equilibrium if the utility function
(7) is maximized for all contributors when r = 1.
Two important comments are in order. First, the majority chosen value of
 is the one that emerges from voting when the salience parameter is (re) for
the decisive voter. At the same time, we assume that, when considering vari-
ations in their contribution to the lobbying campaign, the contributors do not
7There is always a trivial equilibrium where no one contributes, so that a proportional
variation of the individual contributions does not change anything.
8We interpret the Kantian equilibrium concept as a cooperative norm: see Roemer
(2010) and the references quoted there for a justication as well as a history of this concept
in the economic literature, starting with La¤ont (1975).
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a¤ect the salience of the family dimension of estate taxation for themselves,
which explains why the last term of (7) is (e)'(V ) rather than (re)'(V ).
In other words, rich agents contribute in order to change the salience of the
family issue for the decisive voter, but their contributions do not a¤ect the
salience of the issue for themselves (which would be weird). Observe that,
at a Kantian equilibrium, all agents (including the contributors) share the
same valence given by (e). One can view this situation as a long term equi-
librium, where everybody is alike in the salience of family values, and where
the salience of these values is supported by the contributing behavior of a
fraction of high income individuals in society.9
Second, we assume that the bequest decision of agents with wi  ~w is
not a¤ected directly by the amount of contribution they makei.e., that bi
is given by the FOC (4) for all agents.10 Given that the contribution of
wealthy individuals is small compared to their wealth/bequest (see Lincoln
et al, 2006), and that their marginal utility of consumption is already low
and unlikely to be very much impacted by the relatively small contribution,
this simplifying assumption seems quite innocuous. We verify the benign
character of this assumption in our numerical simulations (see footnote 12).
Slightly abusing notation, we denote the majority chosen tax rate by
V (re) to obtain
@V (re)
@r
= eV
0
;
with
V
0
=
0(re)'0
a00()  '00 < 0;
by the FOC and SOC for V .
9Alternatively, we could model the salience of the family issue for the contributors
as (0)i.e., as if contributors were immune to their own propaganda. We would then
obtain that contributors would put less salience on the family dimension, at equilibrium,
than the rest of the population. This would not change the function V (re) as long as
~w > wmed, since the median endowed agent would remain the decisive voter, with the
same preferences as above.
10In the absence of this assumption, increasing all contributions ei proportionately would
decrease the bequests of all contributors (because this would increase the marginal utility
cost of the bequest) and would a¤ect the shape of the government budget constraint (1).
This would make both the analytical and numerical solving of the Kantian equilibrium
much more complex, without any comparable gain in intuition.
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We then have
@Ui(rei; re i)
@r
jr=1 =  ei
ci
+ eV
0

a0(V )  (e)'0   b

i
di

= 0; (8)
with ci = wi   bi   rei. The rst term in (8) is the marginal utility cost of
the contribution for agent i. The purpose of this contribution is to decrease
the tax rate V . This change decreases the public good amount (since, with
 > 0, we have a0(V ) > 0see (5) when it holds with equality), decreases the
disutility due to family concerns and increases the after-tax bequest received
by the child (the three terms in the square brackets). Using the FOC for V ,
we can reformulate this condition as
@Ui(rei; re i)
@r
jr=1 =  ei
ci
  b

i
di
eV
0
= 0: (9)
The rst two terms in the square bracket of (8) cancel out because the ma-
jority chosen value of  equalizes the marginal disutility due to family con-
siderations with the marginal increase in public good amount. As the rst
term of (9) is nil when no one contributes, we obtain by continuity that
(9) is positive for small values of ei provided that bi > 0 and that '
0 > 0
when  = V (0): there is an incentive to contribute a positive amount, since
the marginal cost of contributions tends to zero for very small contributions,
while the benet does not if the family concern function is su¢ ciently convex,
and if the individual leaves a bequest at the tax rate that is majority chosen
in the absence of contributions.11
We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 At the Kantian equilibrium, the individual contribution is an
a¢ ne and increasing function of income.
Proof. Integrating ei over wi 2 [ ~w;1[ in (9), while making use of the FOC
for bi ; we obtain that the Kantian equilibrium is such that
1  V =  V 0
1Z
~w
bidF (wi);
while the FOC for ei then simplies to
ei =
 eV 0
1  V bi > 0;
11This implies that ~w must be large enough so that this last condition is satised.
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so that the contribution is the same fraction of the bequest for all contributors.
Since bequests are an a¢ ne function of income (see FOC (4)), the individual
contribution is an a¢ ne and increasing function of income as well.
We now report some numerical simulations.
4 Numerical results
We assume that the endowment is distributed according to a lognormal dis-
tribution with mean 60 and median 50 (roughly corresponding, in thousand
dollars, to the US income distribution). We assume that  = 0:5, so that
the endowment of a child is a simple average of the parents endowment and
of the average endowment in the economy. We use the following functional
forms for the family concerns, '() = 52=2, and for the salience function,
(e) = 0:1 + 15e1=2. Numerical results are presented in Table 1
Table 1: Kantian allocations (monetary amounts in dollars)
~w 1  F ( ~w) e (e) V Aver. e among
contributors
- - - 0 13.5% -
- - 0 0.1 13.2% -
81 500 20.9% 50 3.45 7.8% 239
150 000 3.4% 10 1.60 10% 290
The rst numerical row in Table 1 simply assumes that  = 0 and re-
ports the value of the proceeds-maximizing tax rate, Laf , which is chosen
by majority voting when  = 0 and equals 13.5%. The second row assumes
that  is determined by the formula above where e = 0, so that  = 0:1
i.e., the salience of family concerns is slightly positive even in the absence of
political contributions by richer people. The majority chosen tax rate then
decreases slightly to 13.2%. The last two rows of Table 1 report the Kantian
equilibrium for two exogenous values of the income threshold ~w above which
agents contribute. The threshold of 81 500$ (penultimate row) corresponds
to the income level above which agents do leave a bequest when  = 13:2%
(the value of V without contributions). In that case, 20.9% of the popu-
lation make a contribution, driving up the salience of the family dimension
to 3.45, decreasing the estate tax rate to 7.8% and resulting in a per capita
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contribution of 50$. The average equilibrium donation among the contribu-
tors (last column of Table 1) is then 239$. When the threshold income above
which agents contribute is raised to 150 000$ (so that only the top 3.4% of
the income distribution play the Kantian contribution game), the per capita
contribution drops to 10$ for the whole population, the salience of the family
concerns decreases to 1.6 and the majority chosen value of the estate tax rate
increases to 10%.
Figure 1 plots the individual Kantian contribution as a function of income,
for ~w =81 500$ and ~w =150 000$. Proposition 1 has established that the
equilibrium contribution ei is an a¢ ne (and increasing) function of income.
We observe that all agents above ~w contribute less when ~w increases. Since
they also represent a smaller fraction of the population, we then obtain that
the per population capita contribution e decreases. The intuition for why ei
is lower when ~w increases is that a given increase in the contribution of every
contributor has a lower impact on V when fewer agents contribute (because
of a larger ~w), hence resulting in a lower Kantian level of contributions. At the
same time, the smallest contribution among the contributors (corresponding
to wi = ~w) increases when ~w increases. This explains the counter-intuitive
result that the average value of ei per contributor actually increases (from
239$ to 290$) when ~w increases.12
Insert Figure 1 around here
5 Conclusion
We have presented an explanation for why estate taxation receives so little
popular support even though most people would not bear this tax. This idea
is based on the observations that many people see any wealth transfer tax
as an encroachment on the free working of families and that this feeling is
reinforced by an intense activity from organizations nanced by contributions
from the very wealthy. This is not the only explanation but it might be
as convincing as others, such as the POUM (prospect of upward mobility)
12The individual contributions remain very low even for rich agents (2 000$ at most for
agents with a 500 000$ income), so that our assumption that bequests are not directly
a¤ected by contributions is reasonable.
11
hypothesis, according to which relatively poor people oppose high rates of
redistribution because of the anticipation that they or their children may
move up the income ladder.
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